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1. Introduction
This paper demonstrates how variation across firms in their requirements for public goods
may bring about differentiation in the levels of public good provision across countries and, as
a result, lead to a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. In the case of zero variation
in firms’ requirements for public goods, a benchmark case, tax competition between countries
for mobile firms is intense and leads to an equilibrium outcome that is efficient (as in Brennan
and Buchanan 1980). As the variation in firms’ requirements for public goods is increased,
the intensity of tax competition is reduced relative to the benchmark case; the level of
public good provision becomes inefficiently low and the difference between the level of taxes
across countries increases.4 The paper then raises the question of whether tax coordination
can alleviate the inefficiency. A ‘minimum tax’ counters the reduction in the intensity of tax
competition resulting from the variation in firms’ public good requirements, and thus reduces
inefficiency. Tax harmonization would potentially counter the reduction in the intensity of
tax competition but would always be vetoed by the low-tax government.5
To obtain our results, we analyze a two-stage game of fiscal competition between national
governments. In the first stage, each government sets a level of public good provision. The
public good is only useful in the reduction of firms’ production costs (there are no consumers
in the model). In the second stage, each government sets its level of (lump-sum) taxes. The
location of each firm is determined (nonstrategically) by where it will make the highest
profits, given public good provision and taxes. An increase in a country’s public-input level
or a decrease in its tax attracts firms from the other country. Governments care about rents
4The notion of ‘intensity of tax competition’ as we use it here is parallel to the notion of ‘intensity of
price competition’ as used in the industrial organization literature (Tirole 1998, Chapter 7). Variations of
the term ‘intensity of tax competition’ are used informally elsewhere in the literature but as far as we know
they have not been formalized.
5The literature on capital tax competition has focused on three different situations. The first concentrates
on the presence of a ‘fiscal externality,’ whereby lowering the tax rate attracts capital to the jurisdiction.
As a result, each government has an incentive to engage in wasteful competition for capital. The second,
following Tiebout (1956), focuses on situations where competition among independent governments is like
competition among firms and has desirable efficiency properties. The third setting combines features of the
other two. On the one hand, competition introduces efficiency-enhancing incentives. On the other hand, such
incentives operate in an environment characterized by market- or policy-failures that make a fully efficient
equilibrium unattainable. The present paper is placed in the third setting. See Wilson (1999) and Wilson
and Wildasin (2004) for comprehensive surveys of the tax competition literature. We will leave aside issues
of commodity taxation, which are synthesized by Lockwood (2001).
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(tax revenue minus public-input costs).6 The efficient solution is asymmetric. The equi-
librium exhibits the properties discussed above and is asymmetric. Note that, because the
model exhibits a unique asymmetric equilibrium, the framework yields a novel explanation
for how traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate
even as markets have become more integrated.
The relationship between public good provision and fiscal competition has already re-
ceived some attention in the literature. Some prominent examples are the following. Brueck-
ner (2000) considers Tiebout/tax competition in an environment where firms’ public good
requirements vary, and shows that firms whose requirements are similar sort themselves ef-
ficiently across jurisdictions. Hoyt and Jensen (2001) consider the capitalization of public
education quality (i.e. a public good differentiated by quality) into house prices in the pres-
ence of tax competition. Justman, Thisse and van Ypersele (2002) consider fiscal competition
when public good quality varies, and identify a ‘fiscal agglomeration’ property which defines
an upper bound on the number of jurisdictions over which firms will locate. Each of these
papers makes an important contribution. None of them, however, treats the limits created
by differing public good requirements to efficiency gains that can be achieved through tax
competition as we do in this paper. Also, none of these previous papers consider the merits
of tax coordination. We will continue the discussion of how the present paper relates to the
literature in Section 6 below.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is set up. In Section 3
the efficient solution is solved for under the assumption that levels of public good provision
and firm locations are chosen by a planner. Section 4 models a game of tax competition
between countries, characterizing a non-cooperative equilibrium. In Section 5, policies of
tax coordination are considered. Section 6 places the paper’s contribution to the literature
and draws conclusions.
6We assume that governments maximize rents but otherwise do not specify their motivation. For examples
of other work on tax competition in which governments are rent maximizers, see Kanbur and Keen (1993),
Hoyt (1995, 1999), Brueckner (2000), Keen and Katsogiannis (2003), and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano
(2006).
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2. The Model
There are two countries, A and B, each of which has a government that sets the level of
public good provision, xA and xB respectively, and the tax level, τA and τB respectively for
its country. There is a set of firms, each of which is able to sell a single unit of a good. The
costs of a firm depend on the level of taxation and the level of public good provision in the
country where it locates.7 We will first specify the behavior of firms, after which we will turn
to governments. Finally, we will set out the sequence of events in the policy-setting game.
Firms are not strategic. Each firm simply takes taxes and levels of public good provision
as given and locates in the country where it makes the highest profits.8 The technologies of
the firms are parameterized by points distributed uniformly on the unit interval. The value
s ∈ [0, 1] uniquely identifies a firm and its technology. The technology of a firm s reflects
the extent to which public good provision reduces its costs. The cost-reducing impact of
the public good on an individual firm operating in country i ∈ {A, b} with technology s
is given by skx θi , where xi is the amount of public good provided in country i and where
k ≥ 0 and 0 < θ < 1 are parameters.9 The parameter θ ensures that the effect of the public
good is declining at the margin as we should generally expect. The parameter k determines
the overall impact of public good provision on profitability.10 Note that, under the present
7Since countries are ex ante symmetrical, firm location decisions and hence the boundaries of the countries
are determined solely by the interaction of policy choices with firms’ public good requirements. This is of
course highly stylized, but serves to focus attention on the relationship between public good differentiation
and tax competition. Additional features could be introduced to the model to make one country more
attractive to firms than others, either by assuming that it is cheaper to locate/set up in one country than
another or that there is an ‘attachment to home,’ but these would obscure the effects we want to focus
on. See Hindriks (1999) for an example of where attachment to home is modeled in the context of tax (vs.
transfer) competition.
8Our model could be extended to consider certain types of multinational enterprise in which the firms
are thought of as subsidiaries owned by a ‘parent’ who chooses the location of each subsidiary to maximize
profits. However, such an extension would not change the basic insights of our model. Gresik (2001) reviews
the literature on taxing multinational firms; see also Bond and Gresik (1996) and Mintz and Smart (2004).
9In principle a firm at s ∈ [0, 1] might be able to change its technology to another position in the [0, 1]
interval. Perhaps it could make an investment that enabled it to make better use of the public good. While
this possibility is interesting, we do not analyze it in the present paper.
For some types of public goods such as intellectual property protection it is more appropriate to think of
the public good as reducing the ex ante expected cost of production. Although our model is deterministic,
this interpretation is broadly consistent with our analytical framework.
10This feature could be modeled in a more realistic way by, for example, making the value of k country
specific. However, the symmetry of k across firms facilitates clearer insights concerning the introduction of,
and increase in, variation of public good requirements across firms.
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specification, use of the public good generates no congestion externalities within the country
and no spillovers to other countries.11 For a given increase in public good provision, the
further a firm is to the right of the [0, 1] interval the greater is the cost-reducing impact of
the public good on the firm’s production.
Each firm is able to sell its single unit at price p and has a fixed per-unit cost, c, that is
independent of public good provision. If the firm at s locates in country i it must pay a tax
τ i. The tax can be thought of as a lump sum tax or a sales tax (since each firm produces
and sells only a single unit of the good). The profit function for the firm at s is thus given
by
pis = p− c− τ i + skx θi . (2.1)
To focus the analysis on location decisions we shall assume that p−c is fixed at a sufficiently
high level for all firms to make non-negative profits no matter where they locate.12
For now, assume k > 0. If xA 6= xB then without loss of generality we assume that
xA < xB.
13 In that case a firm may find it profitable to locate in the country with higher
taxes if the cost reducing effect of the public good dominates.
For given τA, τB, xA and xB we can calculate the position in technology space [0, 1] of
the marginal firm sˆ that is just indifferent between locating in A and B. That is, the firm sˆ
makes the same profits in either country;
τA − sˆkx θA = τB − sˆkx θB .
Then sˆ also determines the share of firms in A and 1− sˆ gives the share of firms in B. We
impose the necessary restrictions to ensure that the marginal firm must belong to the [0, 1]
11Congestion costs are introduced to the model and analyzed in Appendix A2. While congestion costs
have a quantitative effect on the efficient and equilibrium outcomes, they do not affect the qualitative
characterization of the results. So in the body of the paper we present our results using the simpler framework
without congestion costs.
12The price that each firm receives for the good that it sells could be made to vary across firms without
affecting the results.
13In Section 4.2 we will show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which one gov-
ernment must set a higher level of public good provision than the other. Then xA < xB is just a choice of
labeling.
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interval. First, solve the above expression for sˆ and hence define the function14
sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) =
τB − τA
k
(
x θB − x θA
) . (2.2)
Then sˆ, the share of firms in Country A, is defined as follows:
sˆ =

sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) if sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) ∈ [0, 1] ;
1 if sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) > 1;
0 if sˆ (τA, τB, xA, xB) < 0.
If (τB − τA) /k
(
x θB − x θA
) ∈ [0, 1] it is easy to check that all firms s ∈ [0, sˆ) make higher
profits in A than in B and all firms s ∈ (sˆ, 1] make higher profits in B than in A. For the
firms s ∈ (sˆ, 1], the difference in the tax τB − τA is dominated by the lower costs brought
about by higher public good provision. Clearly, the higher is τB the smaller is the share of
firms that finds it profitable to locate in B.
If xA = xB or k = 0 then sˆ as given by (2.2) is undefined. However, xA = xB implies
that the public good offered by the governments is homogeneous, and so firms can be thought
of as responding in the manner of consumers in a Bertrand price setting game. If firms do
not value the public good (k = 0), even if xA 6= xB, either government can attract all firms
to its country by setting a slightly lower tax than the other government. In both cases we
borrow the usual Bertrand assumptions to define the distribution of firms between countries.
If xA = xB or k = 0 then all firms locate in the country with the lowest taxes:
sˆ =

0 if τA < τB;
1 if τA > τB;
1
2
if τA = τB.
We will refer to this case as Bertrand tax competition. The outcome of Bertrand tax com-
petition will be used to define our benchmark case of intense tax competition.
The rents to office, rA, of Government A are given by the function rA = τAsˆ− xA. The
rents to office, rB, of Government B are given by rB = τB (1− sˆ)− xB. All policy variables
take non-negative values. From the rent functions it is evident that the level of public good
provision by a government also determines its cost; a level of public good provision xi costs
xi to provide. In cases where sˆ is defined by (2.2), rA (τA, τB) and rB (τA, τB) are given as
14Parameter values k and θ will be suppressed throughout from general functional notation.
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follows:
rA (τA, τB, xA, xB) =
τA (τB − τA)
k
(
x θB − x θA
) − xA;
rB (τA, τB, xA, xB) = τB
(
1− (τB − τA)
k
(
x θB − x θA
))− xB.
Otherwise, in situations were sˆ = 0, rA = −xA and rB = τB − xB and where sˆ = 1,
rA = τA − xA and rB = −xB. No side-payments are allowed.15
To summarize, in terms of their technological requirements for public good provision,
firms’ positions are fixed in the interval s ∈ [0, 1], but each firm is able to choose its preferred
country to maximize profits. Each government, on the other hand, is able to choose its level
of taxation and public good provision but obviously its country (A or B) is fixed.
3. Efficiency
In this section we adapt a standard definition of efficiency to the context of the present model.
The notion of efficiency determines the maximum level of surplus available for distribution
to the agents in the model.
Definition 1. A plan, consisting of a public good allocation xE =
(
xEA, x
E
B
) ∈ R2+ and a
share of firms sˆE ∈ [0, 1], is efficient if, for all other public good levels x = (xA, xB) ∈ R2+
and shares of firms sˆ ∈ [0, 1], it holds that
rA
(
τA, τB, x
E
A
)
+ rB
(
τA, τB, x
E
B
)
+
∫ sˆE
0
pis
(
τA, x
E
A
)
ds+
∫ 1
sˆE
pis
(
τB, x
E
B
)
ds
≥ rA (τA, τB, xA) + rB (τA, τB, xB) +
∫ sˆ
0
pis (τA, xA) ds+
∫ 1
sˆ
pis (τB, xB) ds.
Under Definition 1, a plan is efficient if it entails the largest possible surplus for division
between the two governments and the firms. The planner’s problem can be simplified to
max
sˆ,xA,xB
Ω (sˆ, xA, xB) = (p− c)− xA − xB + k
2
(
x θB − sˆ2
(
x θB − x θA
))
. (3.1)
15A ‘partial equilibrium’ interpretation is given to the assumption that governments can make negative
rents; either that the model focuses on specific sectors within a larger economy, or that there is an unmodeled
international capital market from which governments can borrow. We do not give greater prominence to
this point because governments make positive rents in equilibrium.
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The first term, (p− c), measures the net private revenues across all firms. These rev-
enues are independent of the levels of public good provision. The terms −xA and −xB reflect
the costs (to society) of providing the public good in each of the countries. The first term
in the parentheses, x θB , reflects the impact on total output across all firms if all firms locate
in B. The second term in the parentheses reflects the loss of total surplus that results if a
proportion sˆ of firms locates in A. This loss comes about because, for all firms, output is
increasing in public good provision and public good provision is lower in A than in B. Since
the taxes are just transfers between the firms and the governments, they drop out of the
planner’s problem.
We will now characterize efficiency in our first result.16
Proposition 1. In an efficient plan, xEA = 0 and x
E
B =
(
1
2
θk
) 1
1−θ . If k > 0 then sˆE = 0; the
efficient plan is unique. If k = 0 then sˆE can take any value sˆE ∈ [0, 1] .
If k > 1 then the level of public good provision is higher in one country than the other.
It is efficient for the planner to only provide the public good in one country and allocate
all firms to that country; sˆE = 0.17 By comparison, if k = 0 then in the efficient solution
there is no public good provision and because countries are identical the share of firms that
locates in each country is indeterminate.
4. Competition in Taxes and Public Good Provision
In this section we examine the outcome of competition for firms between governments within
the framework of a two-stage game of fiscal competition. In Stage 1 of the game, the two
governments noncooperatively and simultaneously choose (as pure strategies) levels of public
good provision xA ∈ R+ and xB ∈ R+ respectively. Then in Stage 2 the governments, having
observed the levels of public good provision, choose (as pure strategies) levels of taxation
16The proofs of all results are contained in Appendix A1.
17In the presence of congestion costs, sˆE > 0. Since, to minimize congestion costs, the planner allocates
some firms to A, it is also efficient to allocate a positive level of the public good there; xEA > 0. However,
the qualitative characterization of the efficient solution remains the same with congestion costs in the sense
that xEB > x
E
A even as the congestion cost becomes large. The reason is that the most productive firms are
allocated to B and it is therefore efficient to allocate a higher level of public good provision to that country.
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τA ∈ R+ and τB ∈ R+ respectively. This order of events is regarded to reflect the idea that
taxes can be changed relatively easily once the level of public good provision has been chosen,
while a change in the level of public good provision requires modification of the infrastructure
through which it is provided.18 Once the governments’ decisions have been taken, firms take
taxes and levels of public good provision as given and choose their geographical locations
(i.e. A or B) to maximize profits. We refer to this whole process, including both stages, as
a tax competition game and we solve for an equilibrium in taxes and public good provision
using backwards induction.19
4.1. Stage 2: The Tax Subgame
We will next solve for Stage 2, where the levels of public good provision by the two govern-
ments are taken as fixed at (non-negative) levels xA and xB.
For given levels of public good provision xA and xB, a strategy τ
∗
A of Government A
is a best-response tax against a strategy τB when it maximizes rA (τA, τB). Government
A’s best-response tax function is written as TA (τB) with Government B’s best-response tax
function being written analogously as TB (τA). A Nash equilibrium in taxes is a pair (τ
∗
A, τ
∗
B)
for which τ ∗A is a best-response to τ
∗
B and vice-versa.
20
We will start with the case where xA < xB. We need the following lemma to establish
best-response tax functions in this situation.
18It will be assumed throughout that mixed strategies in tax rates are not available to governments. This
is generally deemed to be an acceptable assumption in the applied literature on policy setting in a perfect-
information environment. For example (except in part of one result where a pure strategy equilibrium does
not exist) Justman et al (2002) consider only pure strategies in their model of fiscal competition.
19We are not the first to model interjurisdictional competition in tax and spending levels as a two stage
game; this approach has been taken previously by Hoyt and Jensen (2001) among others. As Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) argue in their study of firm behavior, the appropriateness of the set-up, or the game
context, is essentially an empirical matter. Certainly, it seems reasonable to argue that levels of public good
provision are more difficult to change than taxes and so these are set in the first stage because governments
can more easily commit to them. This parallels the familiar argument that firms can more easily commit
to production capacity than prices. Then in the second stage governments announce taxes in the same way
that firms announce prices.
20Note that τA denotes a particular strategy of Government A, whereas TA denotes its best-response.
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Lemma 1. Assume that xA and xB are fixed, with 0 ≤ xA < xB. For given τB, Government
A’s best-response tax function is
TA (τB) =
τB
2
.
For given τA, Government B’s best-response tax function is
TB (τA) =
τA
2
+
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
2
.
The best-response tax functions are illustrated in Figure 1. We see that, for fixed
levels of public goods, optimal tax rates are strategic complements. We will now discuss
the properties of these functions, as this will help us to understand how the intensity of tax
competition is determined in Proposition 2 below.
Government A’s best-response function is derived by rearranging the first order condi-
tion for the maximization of rA. The function shows that Government A’s best-response tax
depends only on the level of τB. Government B’s best-response function is more interesting
because it helps us to see the underlying mechanism through which the intensity of tax
competition is reduced. For any τA, the level of τB that maximizes rB is increasing in k. To
see why, look at the first order condition for maximization of rB;
drB
dτB
= 1− sˆ− τB ∂sˆ
∂τB
= 1− τB − τA
k
(
x θB − x θA
) − τB
k
(
x θB − x θA
) = 0.
From the first order condition it is easy to see that rB is strictly concave. It also becomes
clear that drB/dτB is increasing in k. Look first at sˆ; the second term in the expression
above. Assuming values of τA, τB, and xA < xB that imply sˆ ∈ (0, 1),
∂sˆ
∂k
= − τB − τA
k2
(
x θB − x θA
) = − sˆ
k
< 0.
An increase in k results in a decrease in sˆ. Intuitively, the greater the positive impact of
the public good on profits, the higher Government B can set its tax τB above τA and still
attract a given share of firms 1− sˆ to its country.21
21The parameter θ affects the impact of the public good on profits in a similar but more complex way.
This will be discussed further below.
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Differentiating the third term of the first order condition w.r.t. k, we see that
∂2sˆ
∂τB∂k
= − 1
k2
(
x θB − x θA
) < 0. (4.1)
So if Government B increases its tax this induces firms to move to A, i.e. ∂sˆ/∂τB =(
k
(
x θB − x θA
))−1
, but this effect is dampened by an increase in k. For higher k, Government
B’s loss in share of firms due to an increase in τB is more limited. It is due to these two
combined effects that an increase in k increases Government B’s best response tax for any
given τA; the difference in equilibrium tax levels increases as a result of an increase in k.
In the next result, the outcome of Bertrand tax competition (k = 0 or xA = xB) gives us
our benchmark. Against this we compare the outcome of tax competition when firms care
about the level of public good provision (k > 0) and public good levels are differentiated
(xB > xA). It will come as no surprise that the difference between taxes is minimized under
Bertrand tax competition; this case is included in the result for completeness. The outcome
under Bertrand tax competition is referred to as intense tax competition. If in equilibrium
there is a greater difference between taxes than in the benchmark case, we will say that that
the intensity of tax competition is reduced relative to Bertrand tax competition.
Proposition 2. (The intensity of tax competition.) Assume that xA and xB are fixed.
For xA = xB or for k = 0 (Bertrand tax competition), there exists a unique subgame
equilibrium point in taxes for which τ ∗A = τ
∗
B = 0 and sˆ =
1
2
.
For xA 6= xB and k > 0 assume that xA < xB. Then there exists a unique subgame
equilibrium point in taxes for which τ ∗A (xA, xB) < τ
∗
B (xA, xB) :
τ ∗A (xA, xB) =
1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
; τ ∗B (xA, xB) =
2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
; sˆ = 1/3.
The larger is k, the more the intensity of tax competition is reduced.
If xA = xB or k = 0 then Bertrand tax competition brings about an equilibrium outcome
in which τ ∗A = τ
∗
B = 0; tax competition is intense. Because xA is sunk, for any positive tax
level it is a dominant strategy for each government to undercut the other in setting taxes
and in doing so attract all firms to its country. By assumption, if τ ∗A = τ
∗
B = 0 then sˆ =
1
2
.
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Because taxes are zero the share of firms that locates in each country makes no difference
to rents; thus rA = rB = −xA.
If k > 0 then the difference between tax τ ∗A (xA, xB) and τ
∗
B (xA, xB) is proportional to
the difference between xB and xA and the size of k; τ
∗
B−τ ∗A = k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/3. The intensity
of tax competition is reduced relative to Bertrand tax competition; the extent to which the
intensity of tax competition is reduced is proportional to the size of k. These features of
the equilibrium are seen from Figure 1, which shows that the intercept of Government B’s
best-response function TB (τA) is increasing in x
θ
B −x θA and k. Consequently, the equilibrium
tax levels τ ∗A and τ
∗
B increase as either x
θ
B − x θA or k is increased.
Intuitively, the reduction in the intensity of tax competition for k > 0 is based on the
fact that, as xA is reduced relative to xB, Country A becomes less attractive to firms that
locate in B. So Government B is able to raise its tax, making higher rents from each firm
while holding its share of firms constant. At the same time, this makes Country B less
attractive to firms in A, so Government A is able to raise its tax and make higher rents from
each firm while holding its share of firms constant.
It is interesting to note that the share of firms locating in Country B is relatively large,
at 1− sˆ = 2/3, even though B sets a higher tax in equilibrium. We might have expected to
see the high-tax country attracting a relatively small share of firms but this is not the case.
A higher level of public good provision can have a cost-reducing impact sufficiently large
as to make location in Country B more profitable for a majority of firms, despite higher
taxation there.22
4.2. Stage 1: Level of public good provision
In solving for the level of public good provision by the respective governments, we must drop
the assumption that xA ≤ xB. In looking for Government A’s best response to xB, we must
22For given levels of public good provision, the introduction of congestion costs to our model does not
affect the intensity of tax competition. This is because they make the levels of taxation higher in both
countries but do not affect the difference across countries. Congestion costs do affect the intensity of tax
competition through their impact on the levels of public good provision; we will comment on this in the next
subsection.
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evaluate rA (xA, xB) for xA < xB, xA = xB and xA > xB. The same applies for B.
Using the equilibrium values for τ ∗A and τ
∗
B from Proposition 2 in rA = τAsˆ − xA,
Government A’s rent function is defined as follows:
rA (xA, xB) =

k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/9− xA if 0 ≤ xA < xB;
−xA if 0 ≤ xA = xB;
4k
(
x θA − x θB
)
/9− xA if 0 ≤ xB < xA.
(4.2)
For Government B,
rB (xA, xB) =

4k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/9− xA if 0 ≤ xA < xB;
−xB if 0 ≤ xA = xB;
k
(
x θA − x θB
)
/9− xB if 0 ≤ xB < xA.
(4.3)
A level of public good provision x∗A of Government A is a best response against a level of public
good provision xB, denoted BRA (xB), when it maximizes rA (xA, xB). A Nash equilibrium
in levels of public good provision is a pair (x∗A, x
∗
B) where x
∗
A is a best response against x
∗
B
and vice-versa.
We will now state our existence-and-characterization-of-equilibrium result.
Proposition 3. (The unique asymmetric equilibrium.) Assume that governments play a
tax competition game, with k > 0.
1. There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
2. The equilibrium has the property that one country, say A, provides a smaller amount of
the public good than the other, B.
3. The subgame perfect equilibrium is determined uniquely by the values:
x∗A = 0; x
∗
B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
; τ ∗A =
1
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
; τ ∗B =
2
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
; sˆ =
1
3
.
4. In the (pure strategies) subgame perfect equilibrium public good provision in Country B
is inefficiently low: xEB =
(
1
2
θk
) 1
1−θ > x∗B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ .
Proposition 3 shows that while Country B provides the public good at a positive level,
A provides none at all. Also note that, although taxation is higher in B than in A, taxation
in A is nevertheless positive. Thus Country A has a degree of monopoly power and is able
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to collect rents due to the fact that firms must locate in one country or the other in order
to produce. Finally, the result shows that the equilibrium level of public good provision is
inefficient.23
In Section 4.1 we argued that tax competition becomes less intense the greater the
difference between xB and xA, which suggests that Government A has an incentive to reduce
xA relative to xB in Stage 1 so that it can raise taxes in Stage 2. Proposition 3 shows formally
that this effect does indeed operate to the point where Government A provides no public
goods at all. It seems reasonable to argue that such an effect would operate under more
general specifications than ours, although for more complex models public good provision
may not be driven all the way to zero in A.
Proposition 3 also shows that in equilibrium the opposing forces on xB balance at a
positive level x∗B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ . Tax competition is less intense when xB is increased, enabling
Government B to raise τB while holding its share of firms constant, potentially increasing
rents. But of course this increases the cost of provision, which works on rents in the opposite
direction. The effect of a change in k is clear. As k is increased this brings about an increase
in x∗B because public good provision has a bigger impact on firms’ profits and therefore on
government rents through taxation.
It is easy to check that both governments make positive rents in equilibrium. For
Country A this is immediately obvious because it collects taxes from a positive share of firms
but has no costs of public good provision. For Country B we use the equilibrium values for
τ ∗B and x
∗
B in the expression for Government B’s rents to obtain, in reduced form, rB =(
4k
9
) 1
1−θ
[
θ
θ
1−θ − θ 11−θ
]
. To see that rB > 0 for all θ ∈ (0, 1) note that limθ→0 θ θ1−θ = 1 while
limθ→0 θ
1
1−θ = 0 and limθ→1 θ
θ
1−θ = limθ→1 θ
1
1−θ = 1/e, with θ
θ
1−θ decreasing monotonically
from 1 to 1/e as θ is varied from 0 to 1, and θ
1
1−θ increasing monotonically from 0 to 1/e as θ
is varied from 0 to 1. This makes intuitive sense if we think of the outcome as oligopolistic,
where both governments are able to choose quantities and prices (here taxes) at which they
23In the proof we show that the equilibrium in pure strategies must be asymmetric in that one government
sets public good provision above the level of the other. We prove that this equilibrium exists and is unique
subject to a re-labeling of countries. We then choose to label Countries A and B as before, as the countries
of low and high level public good provision respectively.
13
make non-negative rents.24
We can now determine which government makes higher rents. Using equilibrium values
from Proposition 3, we know that rA =
k
9
(
4θk
9
) θ
1−θ and rB =
(
4k
9
) 1
1−θ
[
θ
θ
1−θ − θ 11−θ
]
. From
this we have that rA ≷ rB if and only if 14θ
(
4θk
9
) 1
1−θ ≷
(
1
θ
− 1) (4θk
9
) 1
1−θ or, equivalently, if
and only if θ ≷ 3
4
.25
Finally, and this is a point worth noting, we are now able to see why the level of
public good provision is suboptimal under tax competition. More firms locate in Country A
under tax competition than under efficiency. As a result, the marginal benefit to a policy-
setter of providing the public good is lower, whether this policy-setter is the planner or the
government. If τA = τB were arbitrarily fixed at Stage 2, then Government B’s incentive
to set xB is identical to that of the planner, and it would set xB = x
E
B. Conversely, if the
planner were constrained to set taxes τ ∗A =
1
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ and τ ∗B =
2
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ , the outcome
of tax competition, then the planner’s solution to the level of public good provision would
be xB = x
∗
B.
As a final point, note that both xEB and x
∗
B go to 0 as k goes to 0. This is plausible since
the public good becomes less effective at saving costs as k tends to zero so no firm will pay
for it, and so no country will (or should) provide it. Thus, as the public good becomes less
effective across the distribution at reducing firms’ costs, and consequently as tax competition
becomes more intense, the equilibrium of the tax competition game converges towards the
efficient solution.26
24We conjecture that this property, governments making positive rents in equilibrium, would hold for a
more general specification of the profit function in that the term kx θi could be replaced by a general function
b (xi; θ, k), with b (·) concave in xi and ∂b/∂k > 0.
25The broader effects of changes in θ are not directly relevant to the focus of our analysis. However, they
are discussed at length in Appendix A3.
26When congestion costs are introduced to the model, as they are increased this has the effect of bringing
about a reduction both in xEB and x
∗
B . Also, with congestion costs x
E
A > x
∗
A = 0; recall that without
congestion costs xEA = x
∗
A = 0. As the congestion cost is increased, the (negative) effect on x
E
B is larger
than on x∗B . More firms are induced to locate in A both in the planner’s solution and in equilibrium. But
the effect is more muted under tax competition than under the planner’s solution because governments care
about their rents and not the overall social cost of congestion. So there exists a level of congestion costs at
which xEB = x
∗
B . But the solution is not efficient since the equilibrium share of firms across countries does not
correspond to efficiency. And as congestion costs are increased equilibrium does not converge to efficiency;
to the contrary, x∗B > x
E
B and x
E
A > x
∗
A. We can thus see by inspection of τ
∗
B − τ∗B = k
(
(x∗B)
θ − (x∗A)θ
)
/3
that tax competition will not in general be intensified and may be reduced by congestion costs.
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5. Policies of Tax Coordination
The two most commonly advanced proposals for tax policy coordination are the setting of
a minimum tax and tax harmonization. The context that we have in mind is the calls for
tax coordination among the member states of the European Union (EU). We argue that the
institutional arrangements put in place by the EU now make it possible to coordinate policy
in a way that was not thought possible in the past. In this respect, the new institutional
features may be interpreted as a political economy shock which introduces the possibility of
policy coordination. We capture this situation formally with a new game where the levels
of public goods are fixed at the equilibrium levels of Proposition 3 and are XXtaken as
parametric. Governments are granted the opportunity to coordinate tax policy; this may
be a minimum tax or tax harmonization. Governments then simultaneously and without
communicating set their tax levels (subject to the constraints of the policy coordination).
Finally, firm location is determined. Now that the overall framework has been set out, we
will consider each tax coordination policy in turn, taking a minimum tax first.
5.1. A Minimum Tax
We examine the imposition of a minimum tax of the kind considered by Kanbur and Keen
(1993). A minimum tax, µ, is a level below which neither government is allowed to set its tax.
Writing the respective levels of public good provision under the minimum tax constraint as
xµA and x
µ
B, by assumption the levels of public good provision are fixed at the levels given by
Proposition 3, that is, xµA = x
∗
A = 0 and x
µ
B = x
∗
B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ . Since without the minimum
tax the equilibrium taxes would be as in Proposition 3, the minimum tax only imposes a
binding constraint if µ ≥ τ ∗A. On the other hand, µ can be set sufficiently high to ensure
that tax rates are equalized. By inspection of (2.2), it is clear that if the constraint sets a
minimum that implies τA = τB then all firms locate in Country B. Since rents for A are
zero if the share of firms that locates in A is zero, a value of µ higher than the value required
to ensure τA = τB cannot yield higher rents for A than with no minimum tax. Therefore,
we may restrict attention to a value of µ that lies between τ ∗A and a value that ensures
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τA = τB.
27
Let µ be set at a level ε above A’s equilibrium tax under tax competition;
µ = τ ∗A + ε =
1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ ε, ε ≥ 0.
Let τµA be the tax that Government A sets in the presence of the minimum tax. By the
concavity of rA in τA, the best Government A can do in the presence of the minimum tax is
to set τµA = µ. The tax set by Government B is determined by the best-response function
TB (τA) =
(
τA + k
(
x θB − x θA
))
/2 as τµB =
2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ 1
2
ε. We can now see that if
ε = 2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
, then τµA = τ
µ
B. Therefore, we restrict attention to ε ∈
[
0, 2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)]
.
To agree upon a minimum tax, the governments must effectively agree upon a value
for ε. We characterize the non-renegotiable minimum-tax-frontier as the set of minimum
taxes (values of ε) for which: (i) neither government can obtain higher rent by a change
in the minimum tax without the other government having to accept lower rent; (ii) both
governments obtain higher rents than with no minimum tax. Given any minimum tax on the
frontier, the two governments would not jointly agree to renegotiate to any other minimum
tax or to abolish the minimum tax.28
Using xµA = x
∗
A = 0, x
µ
B = x
∗
B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ , τµA = µ = τ
∗
A + ε =
1
3
k (xµB)
θ + ε and
τµB =
2
3
k (xµB)
θ + 1
2
ε in the expressions for sˆ, rA, and rB, (that is 2.2, 4.2 and 4.3), we obtain
the following reduced form expressions for government rents. To emphasize that rents are
27For reasons that will become clear, τ∗B does not impose the upper bound on µ, unlike in Kanbur and
Keen (1993).
28More formally, the notion of a non-renegotiable minimum-tax-frontier corresponds to the set of strong
Nash equilibria of a coordination game in which governments choose values of ε. In a strong Nash equilibrium
neither government has an incentive, individually or collectively, to move to a different value of ε. In such a
game the selection of differing values of ε by the governments, either as an initial strategy or as a deviation,
results in a disagreement on the minimum tax and implementation of the equilibrium of Proposition 3.
The notion of the non-renegotiable minimum-tax-frontier is related to the Pareto efficient frontier. The
key difference is that the non-renegotiable minimum-tax-frontier is defined by the outcome of strategic
interactions between the two governments and, as we shall see, is not Pareto efficient.
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being derived under the minimum tax, we shall write these as rµA (ε) and r
µ
B (ε) respectively:
rµA (ε) =
1
9
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
+
1
6
ε− ε
2k
((
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
) ;
rµB (ε) =
4
9
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
−
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
+
2
3
ε+
ε2
4k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
.
We now characterize the non-renegotiable minimum-tax-frontier.
Proposition 4. (The non-renegotiable minimum-tax-frontier.) Fix k > 0, xµA = 0 and
xµB =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ and fix a minimum tax µ = 1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ ε. Then Government A
maximizes rA (ε) by setting τ
µ
A =
1
3
k
((
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
)
+ ε and Government B maximizes rB (ε)
by setting τµB =
2
3
k
((
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
)
+ 1
2
ε. A minimum tax is on the non-renegotiable minimum-
tax-frontier iff ε ∈
(
1
6
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ , 1
3
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ
)
; in that case, both governments make higher
rents than with no minimum tax and any change in the minimum tax yields strictly higher
rents for one government but strictly lower rents for the other government. Any minimum
tax for which ε ∈
(
0, 1
3
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ
)
increases efficiency.
Because public good provision is fixed at the levels given by Proposition 3, we are able
to see the direct effect on taxes and hence rents of introducing the minimum tax. Using (2.2)
it is possible to check that while A benefits from being able to set higher taxes, it loses firms
as ε is increased. As ε is increased above ε = 1
6
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ , the loss to A from the migration
of firms to B is greater than the gain from being able to tax each firm at a higher rate. For
ε > 1
3
k
(
4
9
kθ
) θ
1−θ , A would make higher rents without a minimum tax than with one.29
The implications for efficiency of a minimum tax reported in Proposition 4 are easy to
deduce using (2.2) and (3.1). First note that xµA and x
µ
B are fixed. So, by inspection of
(3.1), the only way that efficiency can change under the imposition of the minimum tax is
by a change in sˆ. Since the imposition of the minimum tax reduces the difference between
taxes, by (2.2), the share of firms that locates in B increases with the minimum tax. Due
29In our model, if a minimum tax were applied in a setting where k = 0 then this would (trivially) imply
no change in efficiency. The reason is that in this case the countries would be identical in the equilibrium of
Proposition 3 (xµA = x
µ
B = τ
µ
A = τ
µ
B = 0) and the minimum tax, by raising taxes above zero, simply implies
a (lump-sum) redistribution from firms to governments.
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to the fact that public good provision is higher in B, this increases efficiency. However,
note that the imposition of the minimum tax does not increase Pareto efficiency because,
while one or more governments is able to extract additional surplus through higher taxation,
this is achieved at the expense of firms’ profits (see the profit function of the firm 2.1; in
it, p − c and xi are fixed, while τ i increases). This result accords with Kanbur and Keen’s
(1993) analysis, which shows that total surplus may be increased through the imposition of a
minimum tax.30 But it adds the twist that the additional surplus generated by the minimum
tax may be expropriated by self-seeking governments if they have to power to achieve this.31
5.2. Tax Harmonization
We consider tax harmonization that restricts taxes in such a way that it moves them towards
the levels that would bring about an efficient outcome, as in Mintz and Tulkens (1996) for
example. To find the taxes that would bring about an efficient outcome, consider a less
general planning problem than the one set out in Section 3 in which the planner chooses
taxes for each country instead of an allocation of firms, and firms then choose locations based
on (2.2). It is easy to see that, since the efficient solution entails an outcome in which all
firms locate in one country, the planner could achieve this solution by setting taxes equal
across the two countries.32 This is equivalent to ‘split the difference’ tax harmonization used
by Baldwin and Krugman (2004) among others. It is different from a minimum tax in the
sense that it imposes a ceiling as well as a floor to the level of taxation.33
The tax harmonization regime that we consider does not necessarily result in complete
equalization of taxes. Instead, in addition to the floor that is put in place under the minimum
tax, a ceiling is put in place as well. We will denote harmonized taxes in countries A and B
by τhA and τ
h
B respectively. Following on from our formalization of the minimum tax, define
30Note that full efficiency cannot be achieved because xµB is fixed at x
∗
B .
31We have not formally analyzed the effect of a minimum tax in the presence of congestion costs but
intuitively the logic of Proposition 4 extends to that setting too.
32See Zissimos and Wooders (2006) for a full statement of the planner’s problem in this form.
33Tax harmonization is formalized as a coordination game between the governments wherein there is
(simultaneous) coordination not just on a minimum tax but on a maximum tax as well.
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harmonized taxes as follows:
τhA = τ
∗
A + ε =
1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ ε;
τhB = τ
∗
B − αε =
1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)− αε, α, ε ≥ 0.
A given choice of ε increases τhA and reduces τ
h
B relative to their respective equilibrium values
without tax harmonization. The presence of the parameter α means that the constraints
of harmonization do not have to bind equally across countries. Indeed, if α = 0 then
the harmonization constraint simply prevents B from raising its tax while the constraint
mandates an increase of A’s tax. For a large value of α, the harmonization constraint
mandates a larger reduction of B’s tax then it does an increase of A’s tax. Solving for
the value of ε at which τhA = τ
h
B we obtain ε = k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/ (3 (1 + α)). We will restrict
attention to ε ∈ [0, k (x θB − x θA ) / (3 (1 + α))].
From (3.1), efficiency-maximizing tax harmonization would involve a complete equaliza-
tion of tax rates; ε = k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/ (3 (1 + α)); this corresponds to intense tax competition,
with the emphasis not on the fact that taxes are set to zero but on the fact that they are
equalized. A key difference is that under efficiency-maximizing tax harmonization all firms
locate in Country B. Rents collected by B increase while rents collected by A decrease. The
level of efficiency is higher than under the minimum tax because all firms locate in B, where
public good provision is higher, while under the minimum tax some firms locate in A.
The fact that efficiency-maximizing tax harmonization would imply lower rents for A
than without tax harmonization prompts us to ask whether there is any degree of tax harmo-
nization, any value of ε ∈ (0, k (x θB − x θA ) / (3 (1 + α))), that would make higher rents for
both countries A and B than without tax harmonization; recall that this is a necessary condi-
tion for coordination. Using xhA = x
∗
A = 0, x
h
B = x
∗
B =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ , τhA = τ
∗
A+ ε =
1
3
k
(
xhB
)θ
+ ε
and τµB =
2
3
k
(
xhB
)θ−αε in the expressions for sˆ, rA, and rB, (that is 2.2, 4.2 and 4.3), we ob-
tain the following reduced form expressions for government rents, which under harmonization
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are denoted rhA (ε) and r
h
B (ε) respectively:
rhA (ε) =
k
9
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
− 1
3
α+ 3 (1 + α)
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
ε
 ε;
rhB (ε) =
(
1
θ
− 1
)(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
+
2
3
ε− α (1 + α)(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
ε2.
By inspection, rhA (ε) is monotonically decreasing in ε for all possible values of α while r
h
B (ε)
is concave in ε if α is small but everywhere decreasing in ε for α sufficiently large.
We can therefore see without further analysis that A would only choose ε = 0; it would
not agree to any degree of tax harmonization. This is true even if α = 0; Country B would
only be constrained by tax harmonization to the extent that it cannot raise its tax above
τ ∗B. As well as telling us that A will not agree to tax harmonization, this also helps us
to understand why a minimum tax is workable; it is because Country B is able to best-
respond by raising its tax, hence making itself less attractive to firms at the bottom of the
distribution, that enables Country A in turn to retain a relatively large share of firms. Hence,
by imposing higher taxes on this relatively large share of firms, A’s rents increase under a
minimum tax relative to the outcome with no tax policy coordination, in contrast to the
outcome under any degree of tax harmonization.
Overall, then, tax harmonization appears to have more favorable efficiency implications
than a minimum tax but its distributional properties appear to limit its applicability. Gov-
ernment B makes higher rents than without harmonization for α ≤ 1, although there exist
values of α high enough that B would lose from tax harmonization as well. In this situation
the gains from tax harmonization would be transferred from governments to firms. If B were
to gain under tax harmonization then this would essentially be because more firms would
locate in B. In general there would be an increase in firm profits because more firms would
locate in B and taxes would be lower there than without tax harmonization. The distributive
effects are unfavorable to A though, and this seems likely to prevent the implementation of
tax harmonization unless side-payments were introduced to compensate.34
34The logic of this analysis also applies in the model with congestion costs.
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6. Relation to the Literature and Conclusions
It was mentioned in the introduction that the tax competition literature focuses on three
different situations. We will now consider the literature in each of these areas in turn and
how the present paper relates to it. Before focusing on specific areas of the literature it
is worth briefly noting that in this present paper each government presides over a country
whereas in much of the tax competition literature governments preside over jurisdictions
more broadly defined.35
The first area of focus is where there is a fiscal externality created by the fact that gov-
ernments must rely on taxation of mobile capital while labor (also referred to as residents)
is immobile. This is sometimes referred to as ‘basic’ or ‘standard’ tax competition. Asym-
metric equilibria have been studied before in such tax competition models; see for example
Wilson (1987, 1991). In Wilson (1991), one country is larger in the sense that it is endowed
with more labor (the immobile factor). Then the larger country sets its tax rate closer to
(but still below) the social optimum, and higher than the smaller country, but at the cost
of allowing some of its (also larger) capital endowment to move to the other country.36 The
asymmetry of tax levels across countries results from the assumed asymmetry of endowments
while in our work, in equilibrium, the asymmetry of country size and the difference in tax
levels across countries are co-determined.
It has been argued in prior literature, in a ‘standard tax competition’ setting where
tax competition is harmful, that the primary purpose of a minimum tax is to limit socially
wasteful competition between the governments. This is the spirit in which a minimum tax
is applied in Keen and Marchand (1997), for example. In our framework, a minimum tax
acts in a similar spirit to reduce waste. But it works in a different way, by increasing the
35Thus, while the issues that we investigate are similar to the problems of fiscal federalism investigated by
Arnott and Grieson (1981), Gordon (1983) and Wilson (1986), the range of policy options that we consider
are more limited than under federalism, mirroring more closely an international setting. Other papers placed
in an international setting include Wilson (1987, 1991), Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Baldwin and Krugman
(2004).
36Wilson (1987) studies a model of Heckscher-Ohlin trade and tax competition, where one country is
endowed with more capital than the other. Consequently, public good provision is above the efficient level
in one country and inefficiently low in the other.
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intensity of tax competition.37
The second situation analyzed in the literature on tax competition is where competi-
tion promotes efficiency. Tiebout (1956) was the first to discuss the idea that competition
between jurisdictions may promote efficiency if citizens are able to sort themselves into ju-
risdictions composed of those with similar preferences for public good provision and hence
a similar willingness to pay. Brueckner (2000) sets up a framework for the consideration of
Tiebout issues (differences in tastes for public services) and tax competition within a unified
framework. The model of the present paper shares the feature of Tiebout-tax competition
that there is variation in firms’ public good requirements. Another common feature is that
governments’ objectives are entirely self-serving in that they are profit/rent maximizing but
are constrained by competition. However, following the structure of Kanbur and Keen’s
(1993) tax competition model, in our model a firm cannot be disaggregated into its capital
and labor inputs. Consequently, the results of the present paper contrast with those of the
Tiebout-tax competition literature in that more capital (i.e. a bigger share of firms) locates
in the country with higher taxation.
Since there is no policy-failure in the Tiebout-tax competition model, efficiency is
achieved in equilibrium through the entry of many jurisdictions.38 In our model, by con-
trast, there is ‘policy-failure’ in the sense that once levels of public goods are fixed they
cannot be altered. This notionally creates barriers to entry of new countries, enabling exist-
ing countries to make positive rents. Since the present paper is placed in an international
setting, it seems reasonable to take the number of countries as given. Alternatively, seeking
parallels with the literature on Tiebout-tax competition, the ‘entry’ of new countries could
be studied in our framework as well. The underlying structure of our model is developed in
an industrial-organization setting by Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Sutton (1991 Chapter
37Keen and Marchand (1997) show that raising the minimum tax also increases efficiency due to the effect
on the composition of public spending. Questions concerning the composition of spending are beyond the
scope of the present paper.
38Other voting or bidding mechanisms have been shown to achieve efficiency in tax competition. Oates
and Schwab (1988) show that majority rule can select the efficient outcome when there is interjurisdictional
competition for mobile resources. Black and Hoyt (1989) show how the process by which jurisdictions bid for
firms may promote efficiency. The promotion of efficiency within the context of competition has also been
discussed by Boadway, Cuff and Marceau (2002), Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989) among others.
Lockwood and Makris (2006) show that wasteful tax competition can be offset through the political process.
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3) in models of vertical product competition between firms. Allowing free entry to occur in
principle, Shaked and Sutton show conditions under which only two firms survive in equi-
librium. Future work might identify such conditions in our tax-competition framework as
well.39
Casella and Feinstein (2002) describe the same variation in public good requirements
that we have in mind: “[Public goods] can be given a physical interpretation - roads, airports,
infrastructure - or ... they can be more abstract - laws and legal enforcement, rules and
conventions, standards and regulations, currency and language. The key feature is that
preferences over the specific realization of the public good are not homogeneous among
all market participants, but depend on the individual’s position within the market.” For
example, in the textiles and apparel market, at the ‘top’ of the market there is ‘haute
couture,’ consisting of the leading innovators in the industry. These firms make extensive use
of international travel and communications networks, employ highly educated and trained
workers, and rely on intellectual property laws to safeguard returns on the designs that
they produce. At the ‘bottom’ end of the market there are so-called ‘sweat shops’ that
employ local and relatively low skilled workers, source inputs locally, and tend to copy rather
than create the designs that they use, and therefore do not rely on intellectual property
protection.40
A related idea to ours is explored by Hoyt and Jensen (2001). They too borrow the idea
from the literature on vertical product differentiation and apply the analogy to the level of
public good provision within the context of tax competition. However, their main focus is
on the capitalization into house prices of the quality of public school provision. While tax
competition is a feature of their model, they do not develop the idea of intense international
tax competition as we do here. And their setting is essentially within the nation so issues of
39In the sense of Sutton (1991 Chapter 3), one might say that we have a model of vertical public good
differentiation, in which expenditure on public goods may be thought of as a sunk cost. This is not to be
confused with vertical tax competition discussed by Dahlby and Wilson (2003) or Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2003), for example, which relates to competition between governments at the ‘federal’ and ‘state’ levels.
Wilson and Janeba (2005) show that a country’s decentralization level serves as a strategic tool under tax
competition which may improve welfare. See also Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2006), who consider
the interaction of horizontal and vertical tax competition.
40Casella and Feinstein (2002) do not focus on tax competition. Our notion of public good is consistent
with other terms used in the literature, including public service (Black and Hoyt 1989), public infrastructure
(Justman, Thisse and van Ypersele 2002) and public input (Bucovetsky 2005).
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tax coordination are not discussed.
Justman, Thisse and van Ypersele (2002) also study a related idea that under fiscal
competition regions can segment the market for industrial location by offering infrastructure
services that are differentiated by quality. They identify a fiscal agglomeration property,
which motivates an asymmetric equilibrium in which one jurisdiction offers a subsidy but
offers public goods at a low level while another jurisdiction offers a higher level of public good
provision but charges a positive ‘entry fee’ to the jurisdiction. However, they do not consider
tax competition nor cooperation over taxes, and do not compare their equilibrium outcome
to efficiency. Hence they do not characterize the relationship between the effectiveness
at reducing costs of public good provision and the degree to which the intensity of tax
competition is reduced.41
Some models of tax competition obtain asymmetry of outcomes as a consequence of
increasing returns to scale. In that setting, industrial concentration creates ‘agglomeration
rent’ (Baldwin and Krugman 2004). Firms benefit from the externalities of location and
the government is able to extract some of this surplus through higher taxation. These
externalities play essentially the same role as the public good externalities in the model of
this present paper (see also Kind, Knarvik and Schelderup 2000 and Ludema and Wooton
2000). Since agglomoration externalities and public good externalities play similar roles
in the models, it is not surprising that policies of tax coordination have similar effects as
well. Baldwin and Krugman show, in keeping with our results, that tax harmonization may
make one or both nations worse off while a minimum tax (which they refer to as ‘tax-floor
harmonization’) may benefit both countries.
Since our model exhibits the feature that one country sets a higher tax rate than the
other, it presents an alternative explanation for the sustained difference in tax rates across
countries.42 While the literature on international tax competition has focused mainly on the
fall in tax rates on capital across countries, attention has recently been drawn to the fact
41A framework of horizontal (as opposed to vertical) product differentiation has also been adapted in
previous work to the context of tax competition; see Justman, Thisse and van Ypersele (2005) for a recent
contribution and review of the literature; see also Groenert, Wooders and Zissimos (2006).
42This feature is of course shared by all of the other models referred to above that exhibit asymmetric
equilibria.
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that some countries have continued to tax at higher rates than others. For example, Baldwin
and Krugman (2004) comment with reference to European nations that ‘it has always been
the case that tax rates have been higher in the core than the periphery.’43 Acknowledging
the crudeness of the approximation, Baldwin and Krugman present data to show that capital
tax rates in the ‘core’ countries France, Germany, Italy and Benelux have always been higher
than tax rates in the poorer periphery countries Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. In 1982
the effective average tax rate (EATR) in the core was 42 percent compared to 31 percent in
the periphery, while in 2003 the EATR in the core was 31 percent compared to 23 percent
in the periphery. These figures support the general observation that, while tax rates have
fallen between 1982 and 2003, convergence between the core and periphery rates has been
limited.44
Although our model can explain in static terms why taxes and public good provision
may be higher in one country than another, it is silent on the dynamics of how taxes have
evolved over time. While some commentators have taken evidence of falling taxes across
all countries to suggest that tax rates will eventually converge, our model suggests that the
long run equilibrium will exhibit differentiation in tax levels across countries. An agenda for
future research is to explain how average tax rates fall over time as markets become more
integrated while still maintaining a stable differential between the core and the periphery.
While we relate the predictions of our model to patterns of international capital taxation,
a looser interpretation could be extended to explain the pattern of taxation across states in
a federation. For example, the variation in tax rates across states in the US has attracted
significant media attention, with the spotlight focused on discrepancies between states where
taxes and public good provision are relatively high, like Massachusetts, and those where
taxes and public good provision are at low levels, such as Alabama. Our model, while
43Tax rates and incomes in some countries traditionally regarded to be on the periphery of Europe have
risen recently (Baldwin and Krugman 2004), leading to suggestions that traditional ‘core-periphery’ distinc-
tions may no longer be valid. We would argue, as do Baldwin and Krugman, that overall the distinction
is still valid, and that it is being reinforced by the arrival of new countries on the ‘periphery.’ These coun-
tries have capital tax rates that are significantly lower than the core and this has prompted new concerns
about the differences in tax levels and new questions about appropriate policy responses (EUbusiness 2004).
Of course, there are undoubtedly features beyond the scope of our model which play an additional role in
shaping core-periphery relationships.
44These averages are calculated from data provided by Devereux and Griffith (2003), and made available at
http://www.ifs.org.uk/corptax/internationaltaxdata.zip. These data focus specifically on taxation of capital.
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focused on international taxation, puts forward a way of understanding these patterns of
variation in taxation across states as well, characterizing a situation where federal transfers
between states are imperfect. Future research could usefully extend our work to a model of
a federation in which a wider range of policy instruments were available.
A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Without loss of generality, assume that xA ≤ xB. The planner’s
problem may be represented as the following constrained optimization problem:
max
xA,xB ,sˆ
Ω (xA, xB, sˆ) = (p− c)− xA − xB + k
2
(
x θB − sˆ2
(
x θB − x θA
))
,
s.t. xA ≥ 0, xB ≥ 0, sˆ ∈ [0, 1] .
This problem can be solved using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions providing that Ω (xA, xB, sˆ)
is quasi-concave in its arguments (it is immediate that the constraint sˆ ∈ [0, 1] is convex).
But note that a unique solution may be obtained directly from the first order conditions for
the arguments xA, xB, and sˆ:
xEA =
(
sˆθk
2
) 1
1−θ
; xEB =
(
(1− sˆ) θk
2
) 1
1−θ
; sˆE = 0.
Using the fact that sˆ = 0 in the other two conditions, we obtain the efficient public good
levels, namely xEA = 0, x
E
B =
(
θk
2
) 1
1−θ . The constraints are not strictly binding and are not
needed to obtain the solution. To confirm quasi-concavity of Ω (xA, xB, sˆ), show that the
second order condition for a maximum holds at any critical point. That is, substitute the
solution values xEA = 0, x
E
B =
(
θk
2
) 1
1−θ and sˆ = 0 into the first, second and third principal
minors of the Hessian formed by Ω (xA, xB, sˆ), thus confirming that the signs alternate
appropriately for the matrix to be negative semi-definite as required. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix 0 ≤ xA < xB and fix τB. Government A’s best response tax
function TA (τB) is given by the solution to the problem
max
τA
rA (τA, τB) =
τA (τB − τA)
k
(
x θB − x θA
) − xA.
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First, looking at the second order condition, we see that
d2rA/dτ
2
A = −2/
(
k
(
x θB − x θA
))
< 0,
so rA (τA, τB) is everywhere concave with respect to τA. Setting the first order condition
drA/dτA = (−2τ ∗A + τB) /
(
k
(
x θB − x θA
))
equal to zero and rearranging in terms of τ ∗A ob-
tains TA (τB) = τB/2.
Now fix τA. Government B’s best response tax function TA (τB) is given by the solution
to the problem
max
τB
rB (τA, τB) = τB
(
1− (τB − τA)
k
(
x θB − x θA
))− xB.
Again, looking at the second order condition first, we see that
d2rB/dτ
2
B = −2/
(
k
(
x θB − x θA
))
< 0,
so rB (τA, τB) is concave with respect to τB. Setting the first order condition drB/dτB =
1 + (τA − 2τ ∗B) /
(
k
(
x θB − x θA
))
equal to zero and rearranging in terms of τB obtains the
result. 
Proof of Proposition 2. By assumption, if xA = xB ≥ 0 or k = 0 then we have Bertrand
competition, so τ ∗A = τ
∗
B = 0 and sˆ = 1/2. Mutual best-responses are obtained by solving
simultaneously for τ ∗A and τ
∗
B using the best-response tax functions: τ
∗
A = τ
∗
B/2; τ
∗
B = τ
∗
A/2+
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/2. Using the results, τ ∗A (xA, xB; k) = k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/3 and τ ∗B (xA, xB; k) =
2k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/3, in sˆ = (τB − τA) /k
(
x θB − x θA
)
obtains sˆ = 1/3. 
Proof of Proposition 3: To determine Government A’s set of best responses, we investigate
the properties of rA (xA, xB). It is clear by inspection of (4.2) that rA (xA, xB) achieves a
minimum at xA = xB. So we can rule out xA = xB from BRA (xB). Now observe that
if 0 ≤ xA < xB then rA = k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/9 − xA so rA (xA, xB) is everywhere downward
sloping and convex over this range. Consequently, xA = 0 maximizes rA (xA, xB) for 0 ≤
xA < xB. If on the other hand 0 ≤ xB < xA, then rA = 4k
(
x θA − x θB
)
/9 − xA, and
rA (xA, xB) is everywhere strictly concave. Differentiating once, setting the result equal to
zero and rearranging, we find that rA (xA, xB) has a unique maximum at xA =
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ .
Thus BRA (xB) ∈
{
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
}
. Because rB (xA, xB) has the same functional form as
rA (xA, xB), it follows that BRB (xA) ∈
{
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
}
; see (4.3). Recall that rA (xA, xB) and
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rB (xA, xB) achieve a minimum at xA = xB. So
{
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
}
is the only set of mutual best
responses and must therefore be a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, there are two Nash equilibria;{
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
}
and
{(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ , 0
}
. But we may now assume, without loss of generality, that
xA < xB. Then (x
∗
A, x
∗
B) =
{
0,
(
4
9
θk
) 1
1−θ
}
is the unique Nash equilibrium. Using these
values to solve for equilibrium taxes from Proposition 2, we have that τ ∗A =
1
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ and
τ ∗B =
2
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ . Thus we have the result. 
Proof of Proposition 4. First note that rµB (ε) increases monotonically with ε. On the
other hand, rµA (ε) is concave in ε; to see this, differentiate r
µ
A (ε) once with respect to ε to
obtain
drµA (ε)
dε
=
1
6
− ε
k
((
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ
) .
Clearly, drµA (ε) /dε > 0 as ε → 0 and drµA (ε) /dε < 0 as ε becomes large. Also, drµA (ε) /dε
declines monotonically with ε. The unique value of ε that maximizes rµA is ε =
1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ .
By definition, a minimum tax for which ε < 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ cannot be on the frontier because
both governments make higher rents by increasing ε to ε = 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ ; thus we have defined
the lower bound of the non-renegotiable minimum-tax-frontier.
By definition, the minimum tax on the frontier must yield higher rents for both govern-
ments than no minimum tax. Because rµB (ε) increases monotonically with ε, B makes higher
rent with any minimum tax than with no minimum tax. However, rµA (ε) declines monoton-
ically with ε for ε > 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ . Therefore, a level of ε > 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ must exist at which
rµA (ε) = r
µ
A (0). It is easy to establish that r
µ
A (0) =
2
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ . Then ε = 1
3
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ is
the unique level of ε > 1
6
k
(
4
9
θk
) θ
1−θ at which rµA (ε) = r
µ
A (0); thus we have defined the upper
bound of the non-renegotiable minimum-tax-frontier. 
A.2. The Model with Congestion Costs
Congestion costs can be introduced in a simple way, following Ahlin and Ahlin (2006). Define
as sˆc the firm that is just indifferent between locating in either country when congestion has
a negative impact on profits. Specifically, we will say that if firm s ∈ [0, 1] locates in Country
A then its profits are reduced in proportion to the overall share of firms that locate in A,
φsˆc, where φ ≥ 0 is a parameter. Similarly, if s locates in Country B then its profits are
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reduced by φ (1− sˆc). Otherwise, the model of firms is the same as specified in Section 2.
Now, the profit function for the firm at s ∈ [0, 1] is given by
pis =
{
p− c− τA + skx θA − φsˆc
p− c− τB + skx θB − φ (1− sˆc)
if s locates in A
if s locates in B
.
Then
τA − sˆckx θA − φsˆc = τB − sˆckx θB − φ (1− sˆc) .
Solve the above expression for sˆc and hence define the function
sˆc (τA, τB, xA, xB;φ) =
τB − τA + φ
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ 2φ
(A.1)
Then sˆc is defined as follows:
sˆc =

sˆc (τA, τB, xA, xB;φ) if sˆc (τA, τB, xA, xB;φ) ∈ [0, 1] ;
1 if sˆc (τA, τB, xA, xB;φ) > 1;
0 if sˆc (τA, τB, xA, xB;φ) < 0.
For xA = xB,
sˆc =

0 if τA < τB;
1 if τA > τB;
1
2
if τA = τB.
The rents to office functions for Governments A and B remain as rA = τAsˆ − xA and
rB = τB (1− sˆ)− xB respectively.
First, let us consider the efficient solution with the congestion cost. The congestion cost
enters the expression for efficiency through firms’ profits, so that the planner’s problem (3.1)
becomes
max
xA,xB ,sˆc
Ω (xA, xB, sˆc) = p− c− xA − xB + k
2
(
x θB − sˆ2c
(
x θB − x θA
))− 2 (1− sˆc + sˆ2c)φ.
A solution may be obtained once again from the first order conditions for xA, xB and sˆ:
xEA =
(
sˆθk
2
) 1
1−θ
; xEB =
(
(1− sˆ) θk
2
) 1
1−θ
; sˆEc =
2φ
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ 4φ
.
Note that while the solutions for xEA and x
E
B are exactly as in the case with no congestion
costs, we have sˆEc > 0 if φ > 0 (and xB > xA ≥ 0). Thus, as one should expect, in the
presence of the congestion cost it is no longer efficient for the planner to induce all firms to
locate in the same country.
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The next step would be to obtain reduced form solutions by, for example, substituting
the solution for sˆEc into x
E
A and x
E
B. Attempting to do so reveals that it is not possible to
solve for general closed form solutions, although it is possible to get some indication of what
a general solution might look like by solving for specific values of θ such as θ = 1
2
.
We are nevertheless able to address our main concern regarding congestion costs using
the above solutions, which is whether and to what extent their presence offsets the effects
of public good differentiation on tax competition. This is done by obtaining a value for sˆEc
when congestion costs are as large as possible. Observe that sˆEc → 12 (from below) as φ→∞.
As an approximation, use the value sˆEc =
1
2
in the above solutions for xEA and x
E
B to obtain
closed form solutions:
xEA =
(
θk
8
) 1
1−θ
, xEB =
(
3θk
8
) 1
1−θ
.
From these solutions we see that countries tend to be of more similar size when congestion
costs are large, and the difference between the levels of public good provision is reduced.
Country A does provide a positive amount of the public good and Country B proves less
then than when congestion costs are absent. However, in spite of the fact that the public
good eliminates the difference in the size of the countries, the difference in the efficient level
of public good provision is not eliminated, with xEB > x
E
A for all k > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1), and
xEB/x
E
A increases in θ and k. Concavity of Ω (xA, xB, sˆc) can be verified for the case where sˆc
in the usual way.
Let us now solve for the tax subgame in the presence of the congestion cost. Solving
as in Section 4.1, we obtain the following. For xA = xB, both governments provide the
same level of public good and there exists a unique equilibrium in which τ ∗A = τ
∗
B = φ. For
xA 6= xB we assume as usual that xA < xB. Then there exists a unique subgame equilibrium
point determined by the taxes
τ ∗A (xA, xB) =
1
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ φ;
τ ∗B (xA, xB) =
2
3
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ φ.
As for the case with no congestion costs the difference between tax τ ∗A (xA, xB) and τ
∗
B (xA, xB)
is proportional to the difference between xB and xA, and the size of k; τ
∗
B−τ ∗A = k
(
x θB − x θA
)
/3.
And the equilibrium tax levels τ ∗A and τ
∗
B increase as either x
θ
B − x θA or k is increased. At
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τ ∗A (xA, xB; k) and τ
∗
B (xA, xB; k), the share of firms locating in Country A is given by
sˆc =
1
3
(
1 +
φ
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ 2φ
)
.
As with the efficient solution, the congestion costs act to push firms towards Country A. If
φ = 0 then sˆc = 1/3 as we should expect. And sˆc is increasing in φ. Also, as we shall see, xB
is decreasing in φ (both in absolute terms and relative to xA) the effect of which contributes
further to an increase in sˆc. Note also that sˆc is bounded from above at
1
2
.
Finally, we can now solve for the equilibrium level of public good provision in Stage 1.
With congestion costs, the first order condition for the maximization of rents in Country A
becomes
drA
dxA
= −1 + 1
9
θkxθ−1A
(
−1 + φ
2(
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ 2φ
)2
)
It is straight-forward to verify that drA/dxA < 0. This is immediate when φ = 0. Now
observe that the second term in the interior brackets on the right hand side converges to
1/4 as φ becomes large. So the sum of the terms in the brackets must always be negative.
Therefore, x∗A = 0 in equilibrium, as with no congestion costs (Proposition 3).
Also,
drB
dxB
= −1 + 1
9
kθxθ−1B
(
4− φ
2(
k
(
x θB − x θA
)
+ 2φ
)2
)
The second term in brackets determines the impact of the congestion cost on x∗B. We
can see by inspection that x∗B is positive and decreasing in the size of φ (equal to the value
in Proposition 3 for φ = 0).
The negative impact of φ is larger in dΩ/dxB (not shown) than in drB/dxB. That is,
the (negative) term in φ in the brackets is bigger in dΩ/dxB than in drB/dxB. This implies
that for large φ there is over-provision of the public good in Country B; x∗B > x
E
B. Solving
for x∗B as φ becomes large, we obtain x
∗
B =
(
15
16
θk
) 1
1−θ > xEB =
(
3
8
θk
) 1
1−θ . This stands to
reason. As remarked above, the congestion cost induces more firms to locate in Country A.
In equilibrium taxes are equalized whether congestion costs are present or not. Country B
tries to offset the loss of firms, and hence rents, by providing the public good at a higher
level. In addition note that xEA > x
∗
A = 0 for all φ. So it cannot be said that congestion costs
neutralize the effect of reducing the intensity of tax competition.
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A.3. The Role of θ in the Model
This discussion continues from the discussion of the effect of k on x∗B in Section 4.2. The
effect of θ on x∗B is less obvious than the effect on k. While for k relatively large, x
∗
B is
monotonically increasing in θ, for k relatively small the effect on x∗B of an increase in θ is
ambiguous. To show the ambiguity, in Figure 2 we illustrate rB under the assumption that
k = 1 (i.e. relatively small) and that all equilibrium values other than x∗B hold; τA = τ
∗
A,
τB = τ
∗
B, x
∗
A = 0 and consequently sˆ =
1
3
. Using these values, it is easy to work out that
rB =
4
9
kx θB − xB. Figure 2 illustrates how rB varies with xB for θ = 110 , θ = 14 and θ = 23 .
We see that for each value of θ there is a unique value x∗B that maximizes rB. Moreover,
x∗B increases as θ is increased from θ =
1
10
to θ = 1
4
but x∗B decreases as θ is increased form
θ = 1
4
to θ = 2
3
. The reason can be seen most clearly by inspection of the first derivative of
the rent function, drB/dxB =
4
9
θkxθ−1B −1. An increase in θ has two conflicting effects on the
first term. While an increase in θ tends to increase 4
9
θkxB, an increase in θ tends to decrease
xθ−1B (for fixed k and xB). Moreover, the negative second effect increases non-linearly with
θ. To put this another way, an increase in θ reduces the curvature of rB everywhere but
also reduces the initial gradient of rB in the neighborhood of xB = 0. Thus x
∗
B may be
first increasing then decreasing in θ. However, it is also easy to see that k may be set large
enough so that the first term is monotonically increasing in k for θ ∈ (0, 1). In that case x∗B
is monotonically increasing in θ just as it is monotonically increasing in k.
The effect of θ on xEB is very similar, for reasons that are closely related. Observe, by
differentiating the planner’s problem (3.1), that dΩ/dxB =
1
2
θkxθ−1B − 1. We can see by
analogy that, for relatively low k, xEB is first increasing then decreasing in θ. As for x
∗
B, it is
possible to set k sufficiently large so that xEB is monotonically increasing in θ.
We are also able to see quite clearly the effect of θ on the suboptimality of public
good provision. We do this by calculating the ratio of the level of public good provision at
equilibrium and efficient levels in Country B; x∗B/x
E
B =
8
9
1
1−θ . Observe that x∗B/x
E
B → 89 as
θ → 0 and x∗B/xEB → 0 as θ → 1. We noted above that the effect of an increase in θ on x∗B
and xEB may be ambiguous. Recall from Figure 2, for example, that an increase in θ could
bring about an increase in x∗B and x
E
B at θ relatively close to 0 but a decrease in x
∗
B and x
E
B
at θ relatively close to 1. From Proposition 3 it becomes evident that there is a systematic
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effect of θ on x∗B relative to x
E
B in spite of the ambiguous effect of θ on the levels of x
∗
B and
xEB.
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